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T.: Administrative Law--Judicial Review--Certification of Questions o

CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-JUDICIAL

REVIEW-CERTIFICATION

OF

QUESTIONS OF LAw.-The state compensation commissioner, after

finding for claimants of silicosis benefits under the workmen's compensation law, held the award chargeable to the employer's account. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, while affirming the award, reversed the determination that it was chargeable
to the employer, and acting under W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 5, § 4
(Michie, 1949), certified to the Supreme Court of Appeals the
question of chargeability. Held, reversing the appeal board and
answering the question, that the employer was chargeable. Rogers
v. State Compensation Comm'r, 84 S.E.2d 218 (W. Va. 1954).
Judge Lovins, dissenting in part, regarded the statute allowing
certification as a violation of the separation-of-powers article of
W. VA. CONsT. Art. V, § 1, and was apprehensive lest such procedure
"pave the way for advisory opinions by this court." Id. at 223.
Certification had not previously been resorted to by the appeal
board. Similar statutes elsewhere are rare; their employment still
rarer. A sampling of approximately three-fourths of the states
revealed five: N.Y. COMp. LAWS § 23 (1946), IND. STATS. ANN. §
49-151 (Burns, 1952), and VA. CODE tit. 65, § 94 (Michie, 1950)
(workmen's compensation laws); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 78, § 35 (1942)
(tax commission), and N.H. REv. LAws c. 287, § 20 (1942) (public
service commission).
But the statutes, though few, are enough to give rise to conflicting judicial views. The New York court refused to answer
a certified question of the validity of a proposed resolution by the
industrial commission, as being a mere request for advice, saying,
"The questions certified under § 23 must be incidental to a pending
controversy with adverse parties litigant." In re Workmen's Compensation Fund, 224 N.Y. 13, 17, 119 N.E. 1027, 1028 (1918).
Indiana takes a diametrically opposite view. While no supreme court decision has been found, the appellate courts accept
the statute as one whose purpose is merely to permit the courts to
assist the board by giving information, answers being for the board's
guidance and advisory only, much like an attorney general's
opinion. Evans v. Watt, 90 Ind. App. 37, 168 N.E. 39 (1929); State
ex rel. Lynch Coal Operator'sReciprocal Ass'n v. McMahan, 194
Ind. App. 151, 142 N.E. 213 (1924); Bimel Spoke & Auto Whiel
Co. v. Leper, 65 Ind. App. 479, 117 N.E. 527 (1917). This position
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has been announced even though in each instance adverse parties
were litigating justiciable claims.
New Hampshire seems to agree with New York, the court
saying of a question certified by the tax commission that, where
justiciable rights are involved and the question arises in adversary
proceedings, there is a proper question for certification. Petition
of Turner, 97 N.H. 449, 91 A.2d 458 (1952). Petition of White
Mountain Power Co., 96 N.H. 144, 71 A.2d 496 (1950), answered
a question certified by the public service commission which was
moot as to the commission proceedings, reasoning that, in the
words of the statute, the answer would "aid in the proceedings".
Both the Turner and White Mountain cases treated the answer
as an adjudication, not just advice. New Hampshire, unlike the
other states whose decisions are referred to in this comment, by
constitutional provision authorizes advisory opinions, see N.H.
CONST. Art. 74; but its court considers answers to questions certified
by the tax commission adjudication, not advice, and so not affected
by this constitutional provision. Petition of Turner, supra. Neither
New Hampshire case was an actual controversy with adverse
parties.
Under the Virginia statute, similar to West Virginia's the
certification procedure has often been used without question of its
validity. See Nicely v. Va. Electric & Power Co., 195 Va. 819, 80
S.E.2d 529 (1954); Allen v. Mettley Construction Co., 160 Va. 875,
170 S.E. 412 (1933); King v. Empire Colleries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139
S.E. 478 (1927); Crawford v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 136 Va.
266, 118 S.E. 229 (1923); Mann v. City of Lynchburg, 129 Va. 453,
106 S.E. 371 (1921). In all of these cases there were adverse parties
and a commission decision before certification for review.
That there is so little authority on the problem posed by
Judge Lovins may be attributed to the fact that so few states have
enacted such legislation and to the wider use of other standard
methods of review. What authority there is, with the exception of
Indiana, suggests that if adverse parties are litigating an actual
controversy the courts may, by way of adjudication, answer a
question certified from a board decision, thus making available
another method of judicial review of administrative determinations.
In Indiana, both the adjudication theory and the corollary limitations are rejected, although the procedure is permitted.
R. H. T., Jr.
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